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 Culture and the EU’s Struggle 
for Legitimacy
Claudia Sternberg
Europe’s current crises seem to have true potential of splitting 
the Union apart. The Euro crisis, the looming threat of Brexit, 
and the refugee crisis have put the legitimacy of the EU and the 
integration project into serious question in the eyes of many. 
The EU’s multiple crisis has once again shifted the question to 
the fore of why we are in this together to begin with. What are 
the ideas, commonalities, and aspirations that unite us? What 
differences divide us, are they dooming integration to failure, 
and do they have to be divisive? Might shared ideas, values, and 
goals help in overcoming Europe’s present discontents, or is all 
lost in the face of clashing interests and incompatible identities? 
What role might culture play in this?
It is important to see today’s crisis of EU legitimacy in histori-
cal context. This is what I will try to do in this essay, moving from 
the foundation of the European Communities in the 1950s to 
Europe’s present discontents. I shall tell a story of how our ideas 
and standards of what it would mean for the EU to be legitimate 
have evolved over time ‒ and of the roles that culture has played 
in these ideas. My story is a tale of how the European institutions, 
political leaders, opinion-making elites (what I shall refer to as 
“EU off icial” discourses) and the wider public in the members 
states fought over what the point of integration was, what form 
it should take ‒ and on what grounds it could be claimed to 
be legitimate. I trace processes of meaning making, by which 
some ideas become more important than others in how we make 
sense of the EU and its legitimacy. Culture has played key parts 
in various of these competing ideas around EU legitimacy, not 
least in many claims that the Europeans form a community, and 
not only because they share a joint project,1 but also because 
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they share common values and ideological commitments ‒ and 
that, therefore, integration and a common European polity are 
justif iable.
My underlying philosophical notion of legitimacy is that 
something is legitimate not to the extent that it meets some 
abstract ideal criteria, nor to the extent that people believe that 
it is ‒ but rather to the extent that it can be justif ied in terms of 
their beliefs about what constitutes legitimacy, in terms of what 
seems plausible to them.2 But what are people’s beliefs about 
legitimacy? They change over time, are essentially contested, and 
embedded in deeper cultural, ideological, or cognitive conditions 
that circumscribe what it is plausible to say in a given context.
A Discursive History of Struggles over EU Legitimacy
A central discursive foundational legitimation technique of the 
1950s, but still robust today, was to focus on common grounds, 
and gloss over potentially contentious issues. Central in this 
discursive culture of depoliticisation was the storyline that Euro-
pean integration was the only way to secure peace and prosperity 
across Europe. In this picture, integration was indispensable 
to achieving security, economic stability, and improved living 
conditions for Europe in an increasingly interdependent world, 
and, given the absolute necessity of securing these aims, a mat-
ter of no alternative as such. Note how this line of argument 
projected that there was such a thing as a European common 
interest, the lure of which belittled any clash of ideas regard-
ing what it may consist in, or any disagreements over how to 
pursue it and how to distribute costs and benef its of doing so. A 
related narrative was that that everyone agreed on this European 
“common good”, and what it consisted in. Cultural or ideological 
differences had no particular place in these discourses. Another 
technique of placing certain rules, actions, and institutional 
features beyond contestation appealed to “the law”, and the con-
stitutionalisation of Community law, as a source of legitimacy 
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for the Communities. More fundamentally though, these peace 
and prosperity, indispensability, and common good storylines 
were underpinned by a general emphasis on harmony and agree-
ment on universally shared goals. This rested on a discourse of 
hope, progress, and rising above circumstance, not least through 
enlightened planning and expert knowledge.
Notwithstanding, and counter to all harmonising efforts, 
rivalling ideas and understandings did exist, and were gathering 
force. The 1960s and 1970s were marked not least by demands for 
European elections, f irst held in 1979. This campaign actively 
politicised what the Communities should be doing, and how 
they should be doing it. The stakes of integration, was the 
rallying cry, were “too important” to be decided on without 
the people. Rather, demands for European elections insisted 
on democracy as a condition of the Communities’ legitimacy, 
ref lecting a deeper cultural shift in hegemonic legitimacy 
understandings. Immediately after the Second World War, 
it had not been so clear that democracy was what rendered 
the post-war regimes of Europe legitimate in the eyes of their 
populations. Given the experience of authoritarianism, many 
people’s ideas on democracy were marked by a certain distrust 
in unobstructed mass politics. Only gradually, over the course 
of the 15 years following the Second World War, did democracy 
emerge as the key element of political legitimacy in post-war 
Western Europe.3
The disputes of the 1960s over how supranational the Com-
munities should be, culminating in the French boycott of Council 
meetings, dealt another deadly blow to the narrative that largely 
everyone agreed on what they should be doing and how. The 
oil crises of the 1970s, f inally, entailed severe f inancial and 
economic turmoil. This, in turn, undermined any claim that 
the Communities were guaranteed to bring Europe prosperity. It 
also undercut arguments turning on eff icient governance on the 
basis of expert rationalities, and on overcoming clashing ideas, 
interests, and identities through the provision of competent 
problem-solving that benef ited everyone.
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To these existential challenges, the European Institutions 
responded with a turn to “the citizens”, and a pledge to “listen to 
what they wanted” in their off icial legitimation discourses and 
strategies. This new paradigm was anchored even more f irmly 
when, in the early 1980s, the “peace-and-prosperity” storyline 
came under even greater f ire. East-West relations were fraught 
once again, and the economies were in recession once again. 
Now the European institutions started a concerted campaign, 
aimed at reimagining the European (Economic, Atomic Energy, 
and Coal and Steel) Communities, holistically, as a “People’s 
Europe”. This appealed to people no longer as “market citizens” 
or consumers of energy and security: but as culturally embedded 
human beings, and as political citizens (“Union citizens”) who 
had rights (participation and protection rights) that were specif ic 
to the European Community. The idea was to make Europe pres-
ent and tangible in their everyday lives: through symbols and 
material benef its, through actively forging a European identity, 
by solemn declaration as well as by multiplying budgets in the 
cultural and communication policies.
Appeals to culture (and that was European as well as diverse 
national or subnational cultures, all “united in diversity”) 
made their grand entry to the landscape of arguments about 
EU legitimacy. People were to associate Europe with culture, 
and this culture with themselves. The Commission in par-
ticular promoted production, consumption, and collaboration 
across member states, in music, f ine arts, popular culture, as 
well as the f ield of the information media. This was to “bring 
the peoples of Europe together”, and make them get to know, 
identify, and sympathise with each other. An underlying hope 
was that citizens would come to associate the practices of both 
consuming and producing culture with Community Europe. The 
gradual transnational intertwining of cultural production and 
consumption was to make Europeans identify with each other, 
with “Europe”, and with the European Community as generous 
patron of culture.
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Such legitimation efforts became all the more necessary as 
integration picked up speed towards the goal of completing the 
Single Market by 1992. And then came Maastricht. The Maas-
tricht Treaty, in the early 1990s, was a watershed. Its diff icult 
ratif ication changed the landscape of what could plausibly be 
claimed about EU legitimacy. Fierce popular and political resist-
ance, combined with plummeting public support rates, caused 
commentators as well as politicians to declare the “permissive 
consensus” dead, whereby the public had supported European 
integration enough not to interfere, or was at least indifferent 
enough about it. It became impossible to maintain that the EU 
reflected what the Europeans wanted. It was widely agreed then, 
too, that the EU’s legitimacy was in crisis, and in many ways this 
is the crisis that has lasted ever since.
The Maastricht debates in the member states turned centrally 
around Economic and Monetary Union, and around concerns for 
economic and price stability. Yet, these concerns tended to have 
deeper cultural foundations. The French, for instance, dreaded 
subjecting their monetary action range to an independent Eu-
ropean Central Bank and to the reunited Germany, whereas the 
Germans feared for their beloved national currency, stylised as 
a symbol of German wealth, power, and national identity ‒ basi-
cally all that was good about Germany ‒ and all now threatened 
by the Euro. Another central point in the ratif ication debates was 
whether democracy was possible at all on a European scale. An 
important French discourse in particular conf ined the practice 
of democracy and citizenship, or simply “the political”, to the na-
tion state. And a prominent German critique questioned whether 
meaningful EU-wide democracy was conceivable at all, given the 
lack of a European demos or people.
Together, these discursive developments rebuffed not only 
the peace-and-prosperity promise, but also the off icial focus on 
the “human dimension” of the EU, the promotion of “European 
culture”, the f ledgling efforts at EU-wide identity building, and 
the introduction of Union citizenship. In discursively managing 
the Maastricht crisis and the EU’s ensuing general legitimacy 
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crisis, the European institutions framed the EU’s legitimacy gap 
almost exclusively in term of its “democratic def icit”. This did 
take up national wider public critiques of EU democracy. But of-
f icial rhetoric focused so much on this issue that it shifted much 
more urgent public concerns with the monetary union, or with 
the power balance in post-cold war Europe, to the background. 
About the Euro, one communication strategy was silence.
In addition, off icial discursive usage effectively stretched the 
meaning of “democracy” in three ways. During and immediately 
after the ratif ication crisis, it often equated democracy with 
transparency or openness, and “closeness to the citizens” with 
subsidiarity. In the medium term, the paradigm of governance 
claimed to offer (Romano Prodi) a more “genuine” and “authen-
tic” alternative to traditional representative democracy, with 
which citizens had anyway become increasingly disillusioned. 
“Governance” focused attention on the consultation of civil 
society organisations as opposed to individual citizens or “the 
people”. It prioritised responsiveness to citizen expectations over 
democratic control, representation, or accountability. Finally, 
institutional discourses and policies projected Union citizenship, 
and identity building, as solutions to the EU’s democratic def icit.
If there wasn’t a European demos, the challenge was to forge 
one, complete with constitutional patriotism. These discourses, 
policies, and reform attempts culminated in the project of the EU 
“constitution”. The very name of the constitutional convention, 
and the eventual constitutional draft treaty was emblematic of 
the fact that the onus had now shifted, from a focus on culture 
and deliberate identity making of the essentialist kind, to the 
instigation of a constitutional “We, the people(s)” moment. The 
subsequent fate of these attempts is well known.
Perhaps at the end of the day, the off icial emphasis on democ-
racy of the 1990s and early 2000s backf ired. In national debates 
on the constitutional treaty, for example, democracy did play 
a key role ‒ but not in the senses advanced by off icial rhetoric. 
Across the member states, the reading was pervasive that citizens 
resisted the EU constitution so as f inally to throw a spanner into 
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the works of the integration process ‒ which otherwise would 
continue to proceed entirely beyond their inf luence or control. 
The French No-vote, in particular, was a statement of popular 
sovereignty ‒ in a rather traditional, majoritarian-electoral 
sense of democracy.4 In other words, the innovative ways in 
which off icial discourses had employed terms like citizenship 
or democracy had failed to turn around the member state’s public 
spheres ‒ they held on to French national-republican tendencies, 
or the traditional democratic ideals implicit in British or Ger-
man EU-democracy critiques. Even more importantly perhaps, 
the constitutional debates constituted powerful assertions of 
the will of the peoples to inf luence their country’s future, and 
Europe’s future.
The Euro crisis and the national debt crises in a number of 
member states, or now the current Brexit debate, have brought 
this message home with even greater urgency. Greek or Spanish 
resistance to externally imposed austerity measures, or the refu-
gee crisis and the way in which the EU and Europe’s leaders have 
addressed it, have seen forceful assertions not only of a popular 
will to be involved in the will formation about what is to be done. 
Even more importantly, on all these occasions it is now there for 
all to see how widely visions diverged of what was to be done, and 
of the social and economic future of Europe and its individual 
member states’ social and economic future. Everywhere, citizens 
have been reclaiming their say in determining how politics is to 
relate to political, social, and economic realities. The people are 
forcing their way in once again. The old mantras of leaving it to the 
experts, or conjurations of an uncontroversial common European 
good, today do nothing less than discredit the EU’s legitimacy.
Three Structural Tensions
What lessons, then, might we take away from this quick 
discursive-cultural history of struggles over EU legitimacy? 
Essentially, it was characterised by three structural tensions 
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that run through all legitimation and delegitimation patterns 
mentioned so far.
First, they all involved a balancing act between bringing the 
people in and keeping them out. Ever since the late 1970s, of-
f icial EU rhetoric turned on “what the people wanted”. Yet, the 
fact that they revolved centrally around the European citizens 
and their needs and sensitivities did not necessarily mean that 
these citizens got more of an actual say. Really they remained 
objects, spectators, and addressees, rather than authors, of EU 
action. Yes, the will of the people was at the epicentre of these 
discourses. But it had a double status: it was referred to both as 
an independent source of legitimacy and, at the same time, an 
object of manipulation. Culture and the media were, at least 
partly, instruments of such manipulation as well as justif ica-
tions in the related discourses. Giving the citizens what they 
wanted, in many off icial discourses pre- and post-Maastricht, 
remained a matter of eff icient policy-making ‒ only now this 
was framed in terms of citizen expectations. It was a matter of 
greater sophistication in mapping, as well as tweaking, citizens’ 
expectations: in other words, of bringing them closer to the EU, 
rather than the EU closer to them. Bringing Europeans closer to 
each other, not least through cultural means, was a key tool in 
this approximation.
Of course, the tension between bringing the people in and 
keeping them out was built into the very nature of the European 
integration project. It arose from its being a top-down enterprise 
in engineering political reality ‒ at the same time as needing to 
make plausible that it was somehow in line with “the will of the 
people” ‒ both in order credibly to claim legitimacy and in order 
to actually function.
Secondly, the history of contests over EU legitimacy has been 
a tightrope walk between claiming legitimacy on the grounds 
of arguments about democracy and about eff icient problem 
solving. My story shows that, rather than being mutually 
exclusive (as in too many cooks spoiling the broth), the two 
types of arguments have always, and necessarily, gone together. 
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Not just any eff icient performance output will do to enhance 
legitimacy ‒ it has to have some credible claim of ref lecting the 
will of the people. In addition, the credibility of such claims 
relies not on a simple match between citizen preferences and 
the goals of integration or its policies. Rather, it calls for open 
processes of contestation over what we want to achieve with 
it and what standards we want to measure it by.5 This is why 
the present disagreements and discontents may end up being 
a good thing for EU legitimacy on some level. Let me explain 
what I mean by this, by moving on to the third tension def ining 
the struggle for EU legitimacy as I described it.
Thirdly and f inally, the discursive history of EU legitimation 
can be told as a story of a push and pull between depoliticising 
forces and counter-forces that actively politicised the stakes of 
EU politics. It is a story of how it increasingly became undeni-
able that virtually any solution in integration politics creates 
winners and losers, of how any discourses glossing over this, and 
emphasising harmony, effectively became counter-productive. 
If there is one key lesson, it is that any claims about the EU’s 
legitimacy have to openly acknowledge the essentially contro-
versial nature of EU politics, in order to be plausible. This was 
a lesson to be drawn already from the constitutional affair, 
and the current debates around the Euro crisis drive the point 
home with even greater force. The EU studies literature has 
been observing politicisation as a phenomenon visible in public 
opinion data and electoral behaviour. While some have warned 
against opening Pandora’s box and inviting contestation ‒ on 
the grounds that it could then no longer be contained ‒ other, 
normative accounts have advocated it, as an end in itself or 
as instrumental to creating, for example, a European public 
sphere. I would advocate being upfront about the controversial 
nature of everything that’s at stake in EU politics is absolutely 
necessary in terms of what has a chance of being plausible, given 
the preceding discursive history of struggles over EU legitimacy. 
The good news is that this constant contestation can be a source 
of, and not only a threat to, EU legitimacy. How so?
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Contestation, EU Politics as Play, and Mutual 
Recognition
One could think of EU politics in terms of the metaphor of a 
game ‒ and cultural production, exchange and consumption can 
play a role in probing and promoting this. Resting the political 
bond that ties us together on such an activity of play is less de-
manding than basing it on cultural or linguistic commonalities, 
or even on a “community of project”. If we play a game together, 
we don’t have to be alike, we don’t have to like each other, or 
want the same thing ‒ all we need to want to do is play the 
game against one another, and stick to a certain set of rules. 
Given the politicisation of EU politics that I sketched above, 
agreeing to contest or compete with each other might be all that 
the Europeans are willing to agree on ‒ and it would not be little. 
While the legitimacy of the EU cannot thrive on contestation 
alone, it cannot thrive without contestation.
Play, and the “play-element in culture”, can have civilising 
functions. It channels interactions into an activity with distinct 
rules, codes of behaviour, and clearly marked limits of where the 
game begins and ends.6 It teaches us how to lose, to be wrong, 
and to respect the other.7 Thinking of politics, and EU politics in 
particular, as a game, might, like a “well-functioning democracy” 
built on the “vibrant clash of democratic positions”, be a way of 
trans- forming antagonism, or struggle between enemies, into 
agonism, or the struggle between adversaries. It might help to 
avoid the danger of “[t]oo much emphasis on consensus and 
the refusal of confrontation”, which in turn may lead to citizen 
apathy, disaffection with political participation, or with European 
integration and EU politics or, worse still, “the crystallization of 
collective passions around issues which cannot be managed by 
the democratic process”.8 Of course, the question remains why we 
should want to continue playing together. With the threat of parts 
of the Union breaking apart as tangible as never before, this is a 
serious question. Simply having locked ourselves into institutions 
and a whole system designed precisely to intertwine our European 
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fates so much that cooperation has become the only option, seems 
to be working less well than it used to. More than ever, then, this 
situation calls for persuasive narratives, arguments, and images 
for why there should be European integration to begin with. 
And no such pleads will appear plausible today if they do not 
acknowledge our essential clashes of interest and identities.
Embracing confrontation and dif ference points to the 
centrality of a norm, practice, or aspiration around which the 
Europeans have built their Union over the past sixty years; that of 
mutual recognition. Besides being a philosophical concept, and 
a diplomatic, legal or technical norm, mutual recognition is also 
a state of mind, a daily practice, or an ethos. Mutual recognition 
as an ethos involves accepting to live and interact with each 
other’s differences, without either trying to make the other side 
be like oneself, or simply stopping at the fact of difference and 
withdrawing into separate spaces.9 Supporting this aspiration 
may be one of the most important challenges, and roles, for 
culture in helping Europe overcome its present discontents, and 
threats of disintegration.
That the EU, an entirely new kind of political animal, was 
built around the aspiration of mutual recognition is no small 
miracle. For, at the same time, the propensity for denying each 
other this recognition remains imprinted in the Europeans’ DNA. 
A tension between promises and denials of recognition is built 
into the European project, as it is innate to human nature. The 
refugee crisis, the Euro crisis, and perhaps even the Brexit debate, 
have cast a merciless light on this basic tension. Any apparent 
progress towards mutual recognition that we had witnessed 
in the last decades has seemed to move into reverse gear. Or at 
least it is radically tested. Longstanding but dormant clashes of 
interests and identities are festering back to the surface, touching 
some raw collective nerves in the process, reviving old tropes of 
prejudice and othering.
Europe’s ongoing crises are manifestations that we are in 
a moment of renegotiation of who we are, and how we relate 
to each other. They have forced us to ask why and up to what 
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point we want to stick together in Europe. Once more, we as 
Europeans, Germans, Greeks, Hungarians, Brits and all the 
rest, are recalibrating how far and under what conditions we 
recognise each other, and under what conditions our Union is 
to last. We are renegotiating the acceptable balance between 
interference in each other’s affairs and deference to each other’s 
ways of doing things and of being: we are engaged in managing 
the rules of recognition in Europe. One can think of this process 
as the deeper socio-cultural foundation of managing the politi-
cal economy of monetary union, and of political union to the 
extent that it exists. Artists, thinkers, and producers as well as 
consumers of ideas and culture are called upon in reshaping this 
socio-cultural foundation in critical ways.
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